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natural world ... the entire set of 
natural ecosystems on our planet, 
along with the populations of animals and plants 
that make up the biotic communities of those 
ecosystems" (3). Nature is thus the life-system 
consisting of all living organisms. 
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Both human and environmental ethics incor-
porate the same notion of a moral agent as 
any being that ... can act morally or 
immorally ... have duties and responsibil-
ities ... be held accountable for what it does 
... form judgments about right and wrong 
... engage in moral deliberation ... consider 
and weigh moral reasons for and against 
various courses of conduct open to choice 
... make decisions on the basis of those 
reasons ... exercise the necessary resolve 
and willpower to carry out those decisions 
... hold [it] self answerable to others for 
failing to carry them out. (14) 
Taylor's definition is in fact only of an agent. A 
moral agent not only must have the capacities of 
self-direction, but also must commit itself to a set 
of ultimate moral principles. 
On Taylor's grounds, "not all humans are 
moral agents, and ... there may exist moral 
agents who are not human.... Perhaps dolphins, 
whales, elephants, and the primates possess '" 
sufficient understanding of their relationship to 
other members of their social group that they 
can see themselves as bearing responsibilities 
toward their fellows" (I E,). In sum, to be a moral 
agent an entity must be able to choose and act 
according to rules to which it has committed 
itself with self-conscious intention. 
A moral subject is "any being that can be 
treated rightly or wrongly and toward whom 
moral agents can have duties and responsibilities 
[thus] it must be possible for such beings to have 
their conditions of exisltence be made better or 
worse by the actions of agents" (17). So "all 
moral agents are moral subjects" (16), but not 
"all moral subjects are moral agents" (17). To be 
a moral subject, an entity need not be a moral 
agent, but "it is always possible for a moral agent 
to take a moral subject's standpoint and make judg-
ments from its standpoint about how it ought to be 
treated.... [for] the furtherance or preservation of 
the well-being of the subject, not of the [moral 
agent] who does the judging" (17). 
Crucially, being a moral subject depends on 
being an "enti ty-having-a-good-of-i ts-own" (60), 
so that "it makes sense to speak of their being 
benefitted or harmed. Things that happen to 
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them can be judged, from their standpoint, to be 
favorable or unfavorable to them" (63). The 
validity of Taylor's environmental ethics depends 
on whether or not an entity that lacks interests 
and self-consciousness - a subjective (self-con-
scious) sense of itself - can logically be said to 
have a standpoint from which its own good can 
be imaginatively projected by a moral agent. 
Taylor says "it is possible for a human being 
[moral agent] to take [any] animal's standpoint 
and, without a trace of anthropomorphism, 
make a factually informed and objective 
judgment regarding what is desirable or unde-
sirable from that standpoint" (67). 
Taylor says every living organism has a-good-of-
its-own and thus has inherent worth, which 
means that each is a moral subject that is worthy 
of respect by and has claims on moral agents 
(75). That an entity has a-good-of-its-own does 
not logically imply that it has inherent worth, but 
in taking the biocentric attitude a moral agent is 
committed to "the principle that living things 
ought not to be harmed or interfered with in 
nature, other things being equal" (72). 
Inherent worth is distinguished from "intrinsic 
value," which pertains to "any activity ... carried 
on for its own sake or as an end in itself' (73), 
and from "inherent value," which pertains to any-
thing "held in high esteem and considered 
important because it is the kind of thing it is" 
(73). Thus, a thing "has intrinsic value for those 
who find satisfaction in it" (73), and "the inherent 
value of anything is relative to and dependent upon 
someone's valuing it" (74). Living organisms may 
have intrinsic and/or inherent value depending 
on an agent's attitude toward them, but all have 
inherent worth, which is not "relativized to the 
subjective valuings of conscious beings" (74). 
"Inherent worth ... is to be attributed only to 
entities that have a good of their own .... a living 
thing ... possesses such worth regardless of any 
instrumental or inherent value it may have with 
reference to the good of any other being" (75). 
Taylor says that just as for human ethics "the 
idea that all persons are bearers of inherent 
worth just in virtue of their being persons ... is 
the ultimate ground of all duties in a moral com-
munity" (78), so also in environmental ethics all 
living organisms are bearers of inherent worth 
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just in virtue of their being organisms. He claims 
that: 
it is possible to establish the truth of the 
claim that a person has inherent worth by 
showing that only this way of regarding 
persons is coherent with the conception of 
every person as a rational, valuing being-
an autonomous center of conscious life. To 
see ourselves as such an entity and to assert 
our own inherent worth out of self-respect, 
while at the same time denying that worth 
to others whom we conceive to be persons 
like ourselves, is incoherent. (79) 
Taylor uses this apparently tautological argument 
form to support his environmental ethics: 
The same type of argument will also hold 
for the claim that all animals and plants in 
the natural world have inherent worth. We 
can establish the truth of that claim by 
showing that only this way of regarding 
them is coherent with how we must under-
stand them when we accept the belief-
system of the biocentric outlook on 
nature.... The central tenet of the theory of 
environmental ethics that I am defending is 
that actions are right and character traits 
are morally good in virtue of their 
expressing or embodying a certain ultimate 
moral attitude, which I call respect for 
nature. (80) 
Taylor says that the only way to argue for 
adopting an ultimate moral attitude is to exhibit 
what it would mean for moral agents to believe 
and act on it. Many such attitudes are possible: 
[For example,] the exploitative attitude, no 
less than the attitude of respect, can be 
viewed as a supreme moral commitment 
that takes priority over all other norms and 
values, as far as the treatment of the natural 
world is concerned. The choice between 
the~e two ultimate, incompatible attitudes 
must then be based on whatever sound 
arguments can be given to show that 
adopting one and not the other as an 
ultimate moral attitude is justified on 
rational grounds. (96) 
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Ultimate moral principles cannot be deductively 
derived from first principles, but only holistically 
shown to be persuasive (14). Thus Taylor's 
"sound arguments" run in circles: 
Now, in subscribing to or adopting that 
total structure of moral principles, we are 
taking a certain ultimate moral attitude and 
committing ourselves to expressing that 
attitude in our conduct and character. Our 
belief that the total system of principles con-
stitutes a valid ethical system is identical 
with, and not a ground for, our belief that 
the ultimate moral attitude embodied in 
these principles is justified. Unlike the spe-
cific moral attitudes of approval and disap-
proval that we have toward human conduct 
and that follow from the ultimate attitude, 
the ultimate attitude itself does not follow 
from any more basic commitment.. .. 
In order to justify the attitude, then, we 
must show that the whole ethical system that 
embodies it is a valid one. How can this be 
done? The only way is to set forth the belief-
system that underlies and supports the 
attitude and show that it is acceptable to all 
who are rational, factually informed, and 
have a developed capacity of reality-
awareness. (97-98) 
The "capacity of reality-awareness" is the ability 
to take the standpoint of a non-self-conscious 
entity that is not a moral agent. (164-165) 
Human ethics is based on the concept of a 
person that is wider than that of a moral agent: 
A person ... is ... a center of autonomous 
choice and valuation. Persons are beings 
that give direction to their lives on the basis 
of their own values. They ... not only have 
interests and purposes, but also have the 
capacity to set long-range and short-range 
goals for themselves in the light of those 
interests and purposes. They have the power 
to decide for themselves what ends to seek 
in life and they can make up their own 
minds about the best means to take toward 
those ends. They have the ability to impose 
order on their various activities and pro-
jects, determining what purposes are more 
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important than others and choosing not to 
take steps to accomplish one purpose if that 
will prevent them from achieving a more 
important purpose. Finally, persons are 
beings who place value on things according 
to how they judge each thing's contribution 
to their overall well-being and happiness. 
(33-34) 
[Persons must have] a sense of their own 
identity over time. For they must be able to 
conceive of themselves as having a future, 
and this means that they believe that they 
will be the same persons later in life as the 
persons they are now, however different 
may be their external circumstances. To 
have a vision of one's life as a unified whole 
and to make judgements in the light of that 
vision requires a sense of personal identity. 
Only beings with that kind of self-awareness 
can be persons. (35) 
Persons are agents, but not necessarily moral 
agents. Agents can follow nonmoral rules of "a 
voluntary association, ... a contest or game, ... 
how-to ... achieve a certain goal, ... society ... a 
state" (29), but need not adhere to moral values. 
Agents also must have self-consciousness through 
time, which is necessary to intentional. action. To 
intend to do something one must know one 
intends to do it; only what an agent does inten-
tionally counts as an action for the agent. 
Taylor says only individual living organisms 
can be persons and agents (he modifies this con-
dition later), because only individual organisms 
can be teleological centers of life in the sense 
that "the organism as a whole is the unit that 
responds to its environment and so accomplishes 
(or tends to accomplish) the end of sustaining its 
life" (122). Being a person thus depends on 
being a teleological center of life, but Taylor says 
a teleological center of life need not be a person: 
Understanding individual organisms as 
teleological centers of life does not mean 
that we are falsely anthropomorphizing. It 
does not involve "reading into" them 
human characteristics. We need not, for 
example, consider them to have con-
sciousness. That a particular tree is a teleo-
logical center of life does not entail that it is 
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intentionally aiming at preserving its exis-
tence, that it is exerting efforts to avoid 
death, or that it even cares whether it lives 
or dies .... organisms like trees and one-
celled protozoa do not have a conscious life. 
They are not aware of the world around 
them. They have no thoughts or feelings 
and hence no interest in anything that 
happens to them. Yet they have a good of 
their own around which their behavior is 
organized. All organisms, whether conscious 
or not, are teleological centers of life in the 
sense that each is a unified, coherently 
ordered system of goal-oriented activity that 
has a constant tendency to protect and 
maintain the organism's existence. 
Under this conception of individual living 
things, each is seen to have a single, unique 
point of view. This point of view is deter-
mined by the organism's particular way of 
responding to its environment, interacting 
with other individual organisms, and under-
going the regular, lawlike transformations of 
the various stages of its species-specific life 
cycle. (121-122) 
I now argue that it does not make sense to talk 
of a non-self-conscious entity's being a teleo-
logical center having a-good-of-its-own. If having 
inherent worth leading to moral subjecthood 
depends on an entity's being a teleological 
center that has a-good-of-its-own, then only self-
conscious persons can be moral subjects. This 
conclusion is independent of whether or not 
those persons are humans. Thus on Taylor's own 
terms, my argument is not anthropocentric. 
Taylor's environmental ethics fails because he 
tries to prove that all living organisms are primary 
moral subjects with an unsuccessful argument 
that all and only living organisms are teleological 
centers of life. 
Contrary to Taylor, it is not "meaningful to 
speak about what is good or bad for [any living] 
organism as seen from the standpoint of its own 
good" (67). It is impossible to "take the stand-
point" of any non-self-conscious organism to 
determine "its own" good because a non-self-con-
scious entity cannot be a teleological center and 
thus cannot have "a-good-of-its-own." 
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Taylor always speaks as though we learn of the 
objective conditions of an entity's survival or 
preservation by subjectively taking that entity's 
standpoint or point of view. But we in fact learn 
what conditions facilitate or impede its survival 
by objective observation of its behavior, for which 
we do not have to pretend to be its con-
sciousness. Logically, we cannot pretend to be its 
consciousness because the entities in question 
are not self-conscious, and thus have no minds or 
mental standpoint to take. But this does not 
vitiate our ability to understand such an entity's 
objective interests in the sense of our knowi~g 
"the environmental conditions it needs to survive 
in a healthy state ... what is beneficial to it and 
what might be harmful to it" (66). 
Taylor goes from the fact that non-self-con-
scious entities have objective interests to the con-
clusion that we can take their subjective 
standpoint to determine their subjective interests 
(67) so they are moral subjects. Thus he goes 
from "is" to "ought" although he denies that it 
can be done (51). That is, he infers from the fact 
that there are objective conditions that will harm 
or benefit an entity that it has moral status 
(inherent worth). 
Note that I am arguing explicitly that we 
cannot imagine taking an imagined standpoint or 
point of view of an entity that does not actually 
have one without entering the fantasy world of 
children's stories. Taylor claims that h~ does not 
base his environmental ethics on anthropomor-
phizing sentimentality, but his use of "moral 
subject" to refer to non-self-conscious entities 
leads him to talk as though non-self-consciolls 
entities have subjective standpoints or points of 
view which we can take. This is anthropomor-
phizing. 
Taylor says explicitly about inanimate objects 
what I argue is also true of non-self-conscious, 
non-agent, non-person living organisms. If we 
keep a sandpile dry, "it is not the sand's own 
good that would be furthered, but [our] purpose 
for which it is to be used.... The sand has no 
good of its own. It is not the sort of thing that 
can be included in the range of application of 
the concept entity-that-has-a-good-of-its-own" (60-
61). Likewise, Taylor says that "purpose is not 
attributable to [a] machine .... It is not the 
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machine's own good that is being furthered by 
being kept well-oiled, but the good of certain 
humans for whom the machine is a means to 
their ends" (61): 
This mode of understanding a particular 
individual is not possible with regard to 
inanimate objects. Although no two stones 
are exactly alike in their physical character-
istics, stones do not have points of view. In 
pure fantasy, of course, we can play at per-
forming the imaginative act of taking a 
stone's standpoint and looking at the world 
from its perspective. But we are then 
moving away from reality, not getting closer 
to it. The true reality of a stone's existence 
includes no point of view. This is not due to 
the fact that it lacks consciousness. As we 
have noted, plants and simple animal 
organisms also lack consciousness, but have 
points of view nonetheless. What makes our 
awareness of an individual stone fundamen-
tally different from our awareness of a plant 
or animal is that the stone is not a teleo-
logical center of life, while the plant or 
animal is. The stone has no good of its own. 
We cannot benefit it by furthering its well-
being or harm it by acting contrary to its 
well-being, since the concept of well-being 
simply does not apply to it. 
This point holds even for those complex 
mechanisms (such as self-monitoring space 
satellites, chess-playing computers, and 
assembly-line "robots") that have been con-
structed by humans to function in a quasi-
autonomous, self-regulating manner in the 
process of accomplishing certain purposes. 
Though such machines are understandable 
as teleological systems, they remain in actual 
fact inanimate objects [Taylor later modifies 
his claim that only living ~rganisms are tele-
ological systems as contrasted to animate 
objects that are merely "understandable as" 
such]. The ends they are programmed to 
accomplish are not purposes of their own .... 
The g-oal-oriented operations of 
machines are not inherent to them as the 
goal-oriented behavior of organisms is 
inherent to them. (123-124) 
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Note that machines are said not to have pur-
poses of "their own" but to accomplish purposes 
of their human makers. Such purposeless 
machines are contrasted to non-self-conscious 
living organisms that are said to have purposes of 
their own, but these purposes cannot be like the 
intentional purposes of the human beings that 
program machines, because non-self-conscious 
organisms do not have minds. I argue that 
entities that cannot self-consciously intend their 
own purposes are not and cannot be (as con-
trasted to "being understood as") teleological 
systems l . What Taylor says next of machines is 
also true of non-self-conscious organisms: 
[T] he goals of machines are derivative, 
whereas the goals of a living thing are 
original. The ends and purposes of 
machines are built into them by their 
human creators.... Although they manifest 
goal-directed activities, the machines do 
not, as independent entities, have a good of 
their own. Their "good" is "furthered" only 
insofar as they are treated in such a way as 
to be an effective means to human ends. 
A living plant or animal, on the other 
hand, has a good of its own in the same 
sense that a human being has a good of its 
own. It is, independently of anything else in 
the universe, itself a center of goal-oriented 
activity [Whose goals? Its own, if it is self-
conscious; perhaps no one's if it is not]. 
What is good or bad for it can be under-
stood by reference to its own survival, 
health, and well-being [its own?]. As a living 
thing it seeks its own ends in a way that is 
not true of any teleologically structured 
mechanism. It is in terms of its goals 
[Taylor's emphasis] that we can give teleo-
logical explanations of why it does what it 
does. [But the question just is whether or 
not an entity that does not have a mind, 
sense of self, and conscious intentions can 
have its own "why" or seek its own goals in 
the sense required to designate it as a teleo-
logical system.] We cannot do the same for 
machines, since any such explanation must 
ultimately refer to the goals their human 
producers had in mind when they made the 
machines. (124) 
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Now follows a key paragraph showing that 
Taylor sees that the distinction between teleo-
logical and non-teleological entities is neither 
based upon nor coextensive with (as he says it is) 
the distinction between living organisms and 
inanimate matter, but on the distinction 
between entities that are self-conscious and 
those that are not: 
I should add as a parenthetical note that 
this difference between mechanism and 
organism may no longer be maintainable 
with regard to those complex electronic 
devices now being developed under the 
name of artificial intelligence. Perhaps some 
day computer scientists and engineers will 
construct beings whose internal processes 
and electrical responses to their sur-
roundings closely paraliel the functions of 
the human brain and nervous system. 
Concerning such beings we may begin to 
speak of their having a good of their own 
independently of the purposes of their cre-
ators. At that point the distinction drawn 
above between living things and inanimate 
machines may break down. (124-125) 
The breakdown would come because, as Taylor 
implies here, such machines would be self-con-
scious, as humans are. They would have minds, 
so they could have intentions, purposes, and 
goals of their own. They would then be teleo-
logical centers, as non-self-conscious entities are 
not. Taylor ignores this insight. He goes on to 
claim that: 
Our ability to understand and take the 
standpoint of individual organisms depends 
... on our conceiving of them as teleological 
centers of life. Our disposition to conceive 
of them this way is supported by our looking 
at ourselves and them as fellow members of 
a community of life that includes both of us 
on equal terms. To the extent that we see 
ourselves to be one with other living things 
in the Earth's biosphere, to that extent we 
are able to achieve the frame of mind for 
having a full sense of the reality of their 
individual existences. (125) 
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Being "fellow members of a community of life" is 
based only on being a living organism, which is 
not enough to establish that an entity has an 
individual existence as a teleological center. 
Taylor goes on: 
We achieve wholeness of vision in our 
understanding of an animal or plant to the 
extent that we no longer look at it in terms 
of a role or function it might have in 
human life.... 
To free ourselves from such one-sidedness 
is to gain an understanding of the whole 
character or "personality" [Note the 
qualification here; Taylor knows that only 
persons actually have personalities and wants 
here to avoid being accused of 
anthropomorphizing; he should use the 
same caution in potentially misleading uses 
of "standpoint or point of view"] of an 
individual based on our recognition of its 
concrete qualities in all their particularity .... 
in our grasp of an organism's uniqueness, we 
come to know the life of that individual as 
lived by it. [But every particular entity is 
unique, so our grasp of uniqueness does not 
establish that we "know the life of that 
individual as lived by it." Taylor says correctly 
on p. 122 that non-self-eonscious entities 
cannot live their own lives, i.e., they do not 
have their own lives] .... 
When our consciousness of the life of an 
individual organism is characterized by both 
objectivity and wholeness of vision, we have 
reached the most complete realization, cog-
nitively and imaginatively, ofwhat it is to be 
that particular individual. We have let the 
reality of another's life enter into the world 
of our consciousness. We know it as fully 
and intensely as it can be known.... 
As a result of our heightened awareness 
of the reality of another living thing's exis-
tence, we gain the genuine capacity to take 
its standpoint and make judgments based 
on its good. Shifting out of the usual bound-
aries of anthropocentricity, the world-
horizon of our moral imagination opens up 
[metaphorically and anthropomorphically] 
to encompass all living things. Seeing them 
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as we see ourselves, we are ready to place 
the same value on their existence as we do 
on our own. (128) 
I have two arguments here. First, in his dis-
cussion of stones and machines, Taylor shows 
that we can learn by objective observation about 
the conditions that will disrupt or facilitate the 
survival or preservation of non-self-conscious 
entities. Taking the imagined subjective stand-
point of such an entity is not necessary for 
learning about these conditions. In fact, the only 
sense of "standpoint or point of view" that Taylor 
actually presents for non-self-conscious entities 
makes the phrase merely a way of referring to 
objective conditions. His use of "standpoint or 
point of view" with its subjective nuances con-
fuses the reference to these objective conditions 
and is an unwarranted verbal bridge to the false 
conception that non-self-conscious entities can 
have, do have, or can be imagined to have sub-
jective points of view. 
Second, Taylor's discussion of the fact that 
non-self-conscious entities cannot have 
knowledge of themselves because they cannot 
have knowledge of anything is equivalent to 
saying that they do not have selves. We cannot 
"see them as we see ourselves" because we cannot 
imaginatively take the standpoint of an entity 
that does not and cannot have self-conscious 
experiences, i.e., cannot see themselves. It is thus 
just as much fantasy to project oneself imagina-
tively into the "life" of a non-self-conscious 
organism as it is to pretend to be a stone or a 
machine. 
Explicitly, there is no "what it is to be" a non-
self-conscious entity. It is sheer nonsense to talk 
of any non-self-conscious entity as though we 
could "achieve a full understanding of the point 
of view defined by its good" (29). For some-
thing to have "a-good-of-its-own" and a "what it is 
to be" that entity, it must be conscious of its own 
good and its own being. By definition, non-self-
conscious beings do not own or have "their own 
lives. " 
Beyond that, if it is a category mistake to make 
merit comparisons between entities that do and 
do not have self-consciousness (130 ff), then it is 
also wrong (as I have detailed,) to say that a self-
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conscious entity can "take the standpoint" of a 
non-self-conscious entity (that does not have a 
standpoint in the self-conscious sense that is pur-
portedly taken for it). 
What we do when we "take the standpoint or 
poin t of view" of a non-self-conscious living 
organism, or, for that matter, a mountain, is fan-
cifully pretend what it would be like to be self-
conscious in that kind of organism or thing. In 
charades, one tries to posture one's body so it 
looks like a mountain. When stalking rabbits to 
photograph them in the wild, one reviews what 
one knows about rabbit behavior. It would be a 
mistake to think what one might do next if one 
had the body of a rabbit and were being stalked, 
because rabbits do not behave when stalked as 
you would if you had the body of a rabbit. Wild 
rabbits are easy to stalk because their species-
specific behavior is very predictable, something 
we learn by observing them objectively, not by 
subjectively "taking their standpoint." One's 
success in charades or in photographing wild 
rabbits is not, then, because we plug into "what 
it is to be" a mountain or into "the reality of a 
rabbit's life," because non-self-conscious entities 
do not have ways of being nor anything that is 
their way of life. 
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The necessary condition for having a stand-
point or point of view is not that of being a living 
organism (or that of being a teleological center 
of life in Taylor's sense, which I argue is too 
broad), but that of having consciousness of one's 
self as occupying the standpoint from which one 
has a point of view. So we cannot "take the stand-
point" of a non-self-conscious entity. But we can 
take the standpoint or point of view of other self-
conscious entities. 
Similarly, non-self-conscious entities do not 
have their own goals. Not all living organisms have 
goals, so they cannot be separated from 
machines or inanimate things on the basis that 
all living organisms are teleological centers. Only 
some are and can be so separated. Taylor says 
that machines cannot have standpoints and 
goods-of-their-own because machines are artifacts 
that facilitate their makers' goals. People who 
believe that God made all nonhuman living 
organisms for human use say the same thing 
about them. Biologists say living organisms 
behave the way they do not on purpose but 
because they have been conditioned by processes 
of natural selection. Most living organisms do not 
have their own goals but like some machines 
merely look as though they do to self-conscious 
entities who are aware of themselves as having 
goals. It is precisely to avoid the anthropo-
morphic fallacy that behaviorist psychologists 
and biologists methodically do not "take the 
organism's standpoint." To speak of a non-self-
conscious entity's having a standpoint or point of 
view and a-good-of-its-own is anthropomorphic 
because it is to pretend that it is self-conscious as 
humans are. This impossibility is just what 
Taylor's position requires of us. 
To be very clear about this, let me say that I 
think that many nonhuman animals - at least 
dolphins, whales, elephants, and the great apes 
- are self-conscious through time and so do 
have standpoints or points of view that we can 
imaginatively project ourselves into. This makes 
them persons. But note that if inherent worth, in 
Taylor's sense as worthy of respect, applies only 
to entities whose standpoint we can take, the 
concept is far from covering all living organisms. 
And given that a person is not necessarily an 
agent, and an agent is not necessarily a moral 
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agent, if moral categories apply only to moral 
agents (as reciprocity theorists of ethics argue), 
then we are also far from having reason to say 
that all persons or all agents are worthy of 
respect. Taylor treats reciprocity theory - that 
moral categories apply only to agents who can 
have both rights and duties - as being special to 
human ethics, but obviously it can be extended 
to any domain of agents, whether they are 
human or not. 
It makes sense imaginatively to take the stand-
point or point of view of another self-conscious 
person. As Taylor says: 
If one does not have the capacity for 
imaginative awareness of another person's 
experienced world, one will not be able fully 
to conceive of what it means to be that other 
person living his or her life. On the other 
hand, to the extent that we develop the 
imaginative power to envisage what it is like 
to experience the world as other people do, 
to that extent we are able to achieve in our 
own consciousness a clear grasp of the reality 
of others' lives. Our sense of another 
person's existence then becomes a 
recognition that the other is a subjective 
center of awareness, just like ourselves. (128) 
What is essential here is the other's possession of 
"a subjective center of awareness," which I argue 
an entity must have if it is to be a teleological 
center. Thus I deny that: 
Our conceiving of each organism as a 
teleological center of life is our recognition 
of the reality of its existence as a unique 
individual, pursuing its own good in its 
own way. By developing the powers of 
heightened awareness of it as the particular 
individual it is, we achieve a full under-
standing of the point of view defined by its 
good. (129) 
Taylor himself provides the argument for the 
inconceivability of this kind of empathetic under-
standing of non-self-conscious entities. What he 
says about bearers of moral rights, I say with 
respect to bearers of inherent worth as Taylor 
defines it: 
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If it is to make sense to say that bearers of 
moral rights are entitled to press their rights 
against moral agents and to demand that all 
such agents respect their rights, it must be 
theoretically possible for them to do what 
they are entitled to do. That is, it must be 
conceivable for them to press their claims 
against others if they choose to.... It is a 
matter oflogical conceivability. What it 
means to press claims against others and 
demand that the legitimacy of those claims 
be acknowledged is simply incompatible 
with what it means to be an animal or a 
plant. An animal or plant would not be the 
kind of thing it is if it were possible for us to 
conceive of it as choosing to press its legit-
imate claims against moral agents and to 
demand that they acknowledge the legit-
imacy of its claims. Therefore ... it is incon-
ceivable for animals and plants to be bearers 
of moral rights. (247) 
I explicitly deny that it is theoretically con-
ceivable for a non-self-conscious entity to be a 
teleological center and thus have inherent worth. 
Taylor says that "As moral agents we see our-
selves under an ethical requirement to give equal 
consideration to the good of every entity, human 
and non-human alike, that has a good of its own" 
(158). One can agree with this and still have an 
ethics that is neither biocen tric nor an thro-
pocentric. Its scope would cover all self-conscious 
persons, but not necessarily all agents and not 
necessarily all humans. Taylor seems to support 
this scope of moral respect in stating the prin-
ciple that "Moral agents are permitted to defend 
themselves against harmful or dangerous 
organisms that are not moral agents" (266-267). 
He stresses that "The statement of the principle 
refers only to moral agents and organisms (of 
whatever species) that are not moral agents" so it 
is not anthropocentric (266). But it is agent-cen-
tered. At most, Taylor's notions of taking an 
entity's standpoint and of an entity's own good 
allow extension of moral scope only to entities 
that are self-conscious persons (who might not 
be agents). I see nothing wrong with this, 
agreeing totally with Taylor's exposition of the 
fact that we can assign legal rights to non-persons 
for their protection or preservation. 
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In sum, one obviously can and does gain 
objective (not subjective) knowledge "of the indi-
viduality of each living thing ... through close 
observation of its behavior and environmental 
circumstances" (165). But it is misleading and 
unnecessary nonsense to say that this knowledge 
is "a state of heightened consciousness" from 
which 
one becomes more fully and more deeply 
cognizant of what it means to be that 
particular center of life. One is thus enabled 
to take its standpoint and imaginatively to 
view the world from its perspective. On the 
basis of this capacity one can then make 
accurate judgments concerning what is 
favorable or detrimental to the realization 
of its good. (165) 
Nevertheless, such "standpoint" talk is 
harmless as long as one realizes that all that is 
being said is that we can learn objectively about 
the life cycles of different species of organisms 
and the behavior of particular individuals by 
observing them, and on the basis of that 
knowledge can do things that will facilitate or 
hinder their survival. But Taylor uses such 
metaphorical talk in an attempt to convince 
others that all living non-self-conscious entities 
are teleological centers with goods of their own. 
He uses this false claim to bolster his recommen-
dation of a life-centered environmental ethics in 
which all living organisms are worthy of equal 
respect. And that view, as I have shown,. he 
cannot support. 
There is a considerable amount in Taylor's 
book that I do agree with: his laudable concern 
for individuals; most of what he says about 
human rights and particularly about stipulating 
legal rights to non-conscious entities (222, 253-
254), and in the second half of his book, much' 
of the substantive working out of moral conflicts 
when one assumes that entities other than 
humans have inherent worth or moral rights. 
But Taylor fails in his attempt to avoid argu-
ments against animals having moral rights by 
using the phrase "inherent worth" to refer to the 
content of "moral rights" (254-255), for he says 
explicitly that they mean the same thing, that 
'The use of the language of rights introduces no 
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new concepts" (254). He must see that if the 
concept of an animal's having a moral right can 
be criticized as he has done, then the same 
concept referred to with the phrase "inherent 
worth" can be so criticized also. Taylor thus 
himself shows how to argue against the view that 
non-self-conscious entities have inherent worth. I 
add the related argument that because his 
crucial concept, of inherent worth - like that of 
having a moral right - depends on taking a 
standpoint, it incorporates the illegitimate 
importation of imaginary personhood by the pre-
tense that non-self-conscious animals and plants 
have subjective standpoints with which we can 
empathize and from which we can speak for 
them by recognizing their own goods. 
Let me close by remarking that Taylor, like 
many environmental ethicists, appears to be (I 
know he is not) ignorant of the strength of the 
opposition. He presents a biocentric environ-
mental ethics on the unargued assumption of 
materialist scientific realism, "the entire outlook 
is fIrmly rooted in the findings of the physical 
and biological sciences" (160). His brief 
argument against Biblical ethics (139-143) is to 
show that it is anthropocentric! He does not even 
begin to face the problem that belief in reve-
lation from some God is the basis of most systems 
of ethics accepted by most humans in the world 
today. How easy if religious belief in theological 
ethics could just be put aside! Taylor himself 
makes implicit appeal to religious sentiments by 
capitalizing the phrase "Community of Life" (99, 
passim) and by using the religious rhetoric of 
commitment and conversion (98, 134, 154-157, 
312). And his explanation that moral validity 
(see index) depends on belief in the very prin-
ciples being validated sounds very like pleas that 
belief in Jesus (or in Peter Pan and the fairies?) 
will make it true. 
Taylor does not even consider idealism. If he 
took idealism at all seriously, he could not 
pander as he does to death-wish misanthropy by 
saying that "It is not inconsistent for a human to 
believe in all sincerity that the world would be a 
better place if there were no humans in it" (52) 
and that "if we were to take the standpoint of 
that Life Community and give voice to its true 
interest, the ending of the human epoch on 
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Earth would most likely be greeted with a hearty 
'Good riddance!'" (115). This shows that 
metaphorical talk of taking non-self-conscious 
entities' standpoints is, after all, dangerous non-
sense. The "Life Community" has no stand-
point, and Taylor's own text shows that so far as 
we know concerning earth's inhabitants, if 
there were no humans on earth, there would be 
no one who could say (or think) "Good rid-
dance!" So why does he perpetrate this cant that 
on the one hand supports the ideology of the 
"rights" of the state or of the "corporate person" 
against individuals and on the other hand 
expresses genocidal hatred for the human race! 
Both from many religious viewpoints and 
from the idealistic viewpoint, it is strictly incon-
sistent to say that the world would be a better 
place without humans, because if there were no 
humans in it, for Christians, for example, the 
world would have no value at all, and for ide-
alists the world would not exist. I am not con-
vinced that either of these views makes sense, 
but I do not think they can just be dismissed. 
Moreover we should not forget that 
Aristotelians find teleological forces and goods 
in all things. Taylor is not an Aristotelian 
because he denies that inanimate entities are 
teleological centers. 
Taylor asks that biocentric environmental 
ethics be considered on the basis of his com-
plete presentation of it. What his presentation 
shows is the strength of the claim that the insti-
tution of morality is generated through interac-
tions among person-agents who have mutually 
agreed to abide by a set of rules .that designates 
reciprocal rights and duties among themselves. 
In such a system, nothing is primarily morally 
good or bad, right or wrong, except moral 
agents and their actions, and - by metaphorical 
allusion - the results and objects of their 
actions. Taylor agrees with this reciprocity 
theory of ethics for humans and other agents, 
but he wants all living organisms to be primary 
moral subjects. Taylor both fails to establish this 
and shows that it is not necessary. Anything (all 
"subjects") that agents want to protect other 
than themselves can be given secondary stipu-
lative rights - call them legal or moral, it does 
not matter which, so long as they are respected. 
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By all means let us have respect for nature. But 
as agents and as philosophers, let us be clear 
about exactly what this means. An agent- or 
person-oriented ethics, as Taylor points out, is 
not strictly speaking anthropocentric even if the 
only moral agents we know of are humans. 
Despite Taylor's talk of the standpoints or points 
of view, goods of their own, and inherent worth 
of all living organisms, he shows at most that 
these concepts apply only to person-agents. In his 
attempt to make all living organisms into moral 
subjects he obscures the useful non-anthro-
pocentric distinction between primary and sec-
ondary moral subjects. It makes no sense to talk 
of a quasi-religious Community of Life consisting 
of all living organisms that are primary moral sub-
jects because they are teleological centers that 
have goods-of-their-own that give them inherent 
worth, which means that we should respect them. 
On the other hand, it does make sense to say that 
living organisms - and, as far as that goes, 
mountains, which Taylor denies moral sub-
jecthood because he knows we cannot think like a 
mountain - be given stipulative, secondary moral 
status by moral agents. Taylor does not, and with 
his naturalistic foundation (160), cannot, show 
that more than this is possible. Why isn't it 
enough? 
1 See my arguments for the priority of self-con-
sciousness in the following articles: "Self-
Consciousness and the Rights of Nonhuman 
Animals and Nature," Environmental Ethics, Vol. 1, 
1979, pp. 99-129; "Self-Conscious Rights," Ethics 
and Animals, Vol. 2, 1981, pp. 90-92; "Interests, 
Righ ts, and Self-Consciousness," Environmental 
Ethics, Vol. 4, 1982, pp. 285-287. On taking points 
of view, see Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like To Be 
A Bat?" Philosophical Review, Vol. 83, 1974, pp. 
435-450. 
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